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Abstract. Computational Trust and Reputation (CTR) systems are platforms 
capable of collecting trust information about candidate partners and of comput-
ing confidence scores for each one of these partners. These systems start to be 
viewed as vital elements in environments of electronic institutions, as they sup-
port fundamental decision making processes, such as the selection of business 
partners and the automatic and adaptive creation of contractual terms and asso-
ciated enforcement methodologies. In this article, we propose a model for the 
aggregation of trust evidences that computes confidence scores taking into  
account dynamic properties of trust. We compare our model with a traditional 
statistical model that uses weighted means to compute trust, and show experi-
mental results that show that in certain scenarios the consideration of the trust 
dynamics allows for a better estimation of confidence scores. 
1   Introduction 
Computational Trust and Reputation (CTR) systems are systems capable of collecting 
trust information about candidate partners and of computing confidence scores for 
each one of these partners. In this document, we envision trust as the confidence that 
the trustier agent has on the capabilities and the willingness of a candidate partner 
(trustee) in fulfilling its assigned tasks, in conformance to a given associated Service 
Level Agreement (SLA). CTR systems can be centralized, as adequate to electronic 
institutions and virtual organizations (VO), or decentralized, as adequate to extremely 
open environments where agents can enter and leave the society at any time.  
Although practical examples of CTR systems do already exist (e.g. in e-commerce 
sites of eBay.com, Amazon.com, and Epinions.com1), there are still many open ques-
tions in this research area. In fact, current work on trust and reputation has diversified 
in multiple subfields. In the theoretical domain, there is important work on trust and 
reputation as elements of social intelligence. Conte (2002) addresses the theoretical 
issues related to reputation and image in artificial societies and social simulation [1], 
and this cognitive model of reputation was recently extended in order to more thor-
oughly address the transmission of reputation [2]. In a more practical sense, a great 
deal of research effort is being put in the representation and aggregation of social 
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 evaluations into trust and/or reputation scores, which would serve as input to partner 
selection in electronic business scenarios. These models range from arithmetic means 
and weighted means ([3] [4] [5]), to Beta ([6]) and Dirichlet distributions ([7]), 
Bayesian approaches ([8] [9]), and trust learning approaches ([10] [11] [12]). Some of 
these models are implemented using cognitive based beliefs, desires and intentions 
(BDI) architectures ([5] [13]). A new trend of investigation in this area is the explora-
tion of the business context to improve the decision making, raising significantly the 
number and type of information that the evaluator has in order to compute trust. How-
ever, few proposals have been made in this specific area ([14]).  
Another area of little research work is the consideration of the dynamics of trust in 
the computation of confidence scores. Our hypothesis is that the use of an aggregation 
engine that encompasses the past experiences of the trustee agent and that accounts 
for fundamental dynamics of trust could allow for a better estimation of the trustee 
trustworthiness than probabilistic and statistical approaches that exist in the literature. 
Due to the relevance of this issue on our work, we dedicate the next section to the 
presentation of relevant dynamics of trust. 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present Si-
nAlpha, a non-statistical aggregation engine that uses an S-shape curve to compute 
trust scores, taking into account three properties of trust dynamics: the asymmetry, the 
distinguishability of past evidences and the consideration of distinct maturity phases 
on the behaviour of target agents. Section 3 presents the experimental phase of our 
work. It introduces STexVM, a simulated virtual textile marketplace that we have 
developed in agent technology in order to evaluate the SinAlpha model and to com-
pare it with other strategies. Then it proceeds with the presentation of the results of 
our experiments and with the analysis of these results. Section 4 presents the conclud-
ing remarks and future work. 
1.1   The Dynamics of Trust 
The evolution of trust over time was baptized by Elofson in 1997 [15] as the dynamics 
of trust, and was addressed one year later by Castelfranchi and Falcone [16]. An in-
teresting formalization of the dynamics of trust is presented by Jonker and Treur in 
1999 [17], who defend the need for a continuous verification and validation in the 
trust building process, and define six different types of trust dynamics: 
 
− Blindly positive: the agent is unconditionally trusted or after a certain number or 
sequence of positive trust experiences (i.e. evaluated events) the agent reaches the 
state of unconditional trust and stays there for good; 
− Blindly negative: the agent is unconditionally distrusted or after a certain number 
or sequence of negative trust experiences the agent reaches the state of uncondi-
tional distrust and stays there for good; 
− Slow positive, fast negative: it takes a lot of trust-positive experiences to gain trust 
and it takes only a few trust-negative experiences to lose trust; 
− Balanced slow: trust moves in slow dynamics in both positive and negative sense; 
− Balanced fast: trust moves in fast dynamics in both positive and negative sense; 
− Slow negative, fast positive: it takes a lot of trust-negative experiences to lose trust 
and it takes only a few trust-positive experiences to gain trust. 
The authors also suggest that the dynamics of trust can be formalized through trust 
evolution functions (mathematical functions that relate sequences of experiences to 
trust representation) or through trust update functions (mathematical functions that 
relate a current trust representation and a current experience to the next trust represen-
tation). They formally define both functions and provide a set of interesting properties 
that can be associated to each one of the functions. Although this work is based on 
simple assumptions such as past direct experiences and binary evaluated events, it 
provides important considerations that shall be taken into account when designing an 
aggregation engine. Also, the slow positive, fast negative type of trust dynamics re-
sponds to the common sense idea that trust shall grow slower and decline faster, as 
interestingly put in the famous words of the English poet Alexander Pope: ‘At every 
word a reputation dies’. At this respect, Marsh [18] also strongly suggested to penal-
ize deceit behaviour stronger than to award the cooperative ones, as in the real world 
it is easier to loose, than to gain trust. 
Melaye and Demazeau (2005) [19] further explore the dynamics of trust, proposing 
a Bayesian trust formalism based on Castelfranchi and Falcone’s cognitive model. 
They use a Kalman filter to address two dimensions of the trust dynamics: the asym-
metric increase/decrease of trust and the inherent speed of switching from trust to 
distrust and vice versa, which they name inertia; and the erosion of trust that happens 
due to the absence of new observations. In their model, the outcome of an execution is 
statistically dependent of previous executions, supporting, therefore, the mentioned 
trust dynamics. The introduction of the erosion dimension is of particular interest, as 
current trust and reputation systems tend to omit this characteristic, particularly those 
whose aggregation engine is based on statistical operations. However, the proposed 
Bayesian presents some drawbacks. In one hand, the model seems not to be scalable 
in the case of several beliefs and several source beliefs, and the authors assume statis-
tical independence between each one of the belief and source beliefs’ levels. Also, as 
the authors indicate, the inertia of trust and distrust is fixed a priori by a specialist, 
requiring one instance of the model per context. Finally, the proposed model seems to 
be too sensitive in relation to single occurrences of deceptive behaviour. In fact, in 
one experiment described in [19], a single negative observation that happens after a 
high number of previously observed positive experiences makes the trust level to 
decrease sharply, after which it takes a long sequence of positive observations to 
getting back to the previously trust value. In our opinion, this strong penalization does 
not reflect the real world response to one exceptional bad result of a previously trust-
able partner. 
2   The SinAlpha Aggregation Engine 
As already mentioned, we are interested in designing and implementing mechanisms 
that allow for an expressive representation of the dynamics of trust, when aggregating 
trust evidences. Particularly, we are interested in the asymmetry property, that stipu-
lates that trust is hard to gain and easy to lose; in the maturity phase of targets prop-
erty, where the slope of growth can be different in different stages of the partner 
trustworthiness; and in the distinguishability property of past behaviour. The sigmoid 
curve represented in Figure 1 presents interesting characteristics that seem to fit the 
 desideratum well. For simplicity, we assume that the available information about a 
candidate partner is given by a central trust authority (e.g. a CTR service that serves 
the VO), and that it takes the form of binary values, either representing past success-
ful (1) or violated (0) contracts by the partner.2 
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Fig. 1. Two S-shape curves, one exponential (Sigmoid) and one trigonometric (SinAlpha) 
The constructing of trust for this partner using the sigmoid curve implies a slow 
growth upon positive results when the partner is not yet trustable, it accelerates when 
it is acquiring confidence, and finally slows down when the partner is considered 
trustable (i.e., in the top right third of the curve). The decrease movement upon nega-
tive results follows the same logic. However, we intuitively feel by graphically ana-
lysing the curve that it permits a probably too soft penalisation of partners that proved 
to be trustable but that failed the last n contracts. Therefore, we lightly soften the 
slope of the sigmoid shape at the top and bottom thirds of the curve, by using instead 
the trigonometric formula presented in (1) and depicted in Figure 1, with the name of 
SinAlpha. 
y(α) = δ.sin α + δ,    α0 = 3π/2 , 
α = α + λ.ω . 
(1) 
In the formula above, δ is a constant value of 0.5, and α ranges from 3π/2 to 5π/2, 
allowing for aggregated trust scores within the range [0, 1]. The incremental step of α 
is also shown in (1); ω represents the pace of trust growth (we assume the value of π/2 
in our experiments), and λ is the parameter of the incremental step that allows to 
differentiate between positive and negative results (in our experiments, λ equals +1 
for each positive result to be aggregated, and -1.5 for each violated contract). This 
way, in each one of the three stages of trust construction, trust grows slower and de-
creases faster. At this point, we must remind our interest in studying how a curve like 
the one we propose, which, in a certain way, ‘encompasses’ the historical behaviour 
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of the partner under evaluation, is able to catch the dynamics of trust in the presence 
of certain partners’ patterns of behaviour. We are also willing to know how this model 
can be compared with the common statistical approach that aggregates trust informa-
tion using weighted means.  
3   Experiments 
3.1   The STexVM System 
In order to run our experiments, we developed the STexVM system. This is a simu-
lated virtual marketplace for trading textile goods that aims to ensure reliable transac-
tions, in a sense that it is able to detect business partners that in some moment start 
behaving in a defective way. The simulated environment is based on existent online 
virtual marketplaces where buyers and sellers in the textile and fashion industry can 
post buying and selling leads (e.g. the Fibre2Fashion marketplace3). It follows the 
multi-agent paradigm, and is implemented over Jade platform, using the standard 
behaviours of Jade and FIPA performatives and interaction protocols4. The key agents 
in this environment have the roles either of buyers or suppliers (Figure 2).  
At each round, a buyer issues a call for proposal (cfp) stipulating a specific good 
and associated quantity that needs to be provided, and each candidate partner re-
sponds indicating the quantity it is able to provide in the present business opportunity, 
or refusing the offer. A contract-net like negotiation occurs, and the buyer selects a 
number n > 0 of partners that optimizes the expected utility E(u), using equation (2). 
E(u) = arg maxi for each i Σj utilj * trustj . (2) 
In the equation above, i stands for the possible combinations of suppliers’ proposals 
that fit the quantity specified in the current cfp, not exceeding it; j represents the sup-
pliers considered in each of these combinations, and trustj is the confidence score 
computed for supplier j at selection time. Finally, utilj is the quantity proposed by 
each supplier j in the round, normalized by the quantity specified in the cfp, i.e., 
quantj/Quant. In our system, a buyer can accept less quantity than the maximum 
quantity (Quant) defined in the cfp, but it cannot exceed Quant. Also, a buyer cannot 
accept partial quantities of the received bids. 
Each supplier that enters the simulated virtual marketplace sells two different types 
of fabric (e.g. cotton and chiffon). These and their associated quantities (e.g. 180,000 
meters) are randomly assigned at creation time. Buyers are characterized by the good 
and quantity they need to purchase, also randomly picked up at creation time. The 
remaining agents of the STexVM system are the Agent Simulation Manager, who 
manages the configuration parameters related with buyers and suppliers; the Agent 
DF, which registers competences of buyers and suppliers; and the Agent CTR, which 
gathers information about the performance of suppliers and computes their confidence 
scores on-demand, when requested by the buyers. Figure 2 illustrates the relation 
between these agents. 
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Fig. 2. Interactions between agents in the STexVM system 
3.2   Approaches in Evaluation 
In the following experiments, a buyer agent can be assigned one of four different 
approaches for selecting partners. The SINALPHA approach uses equation (1) to 
estimate a truth score for each candidate partner and weights the resulting score with a 
recency factor. The ASYM+ approach is a similar, former model that we proposed in 
[20] that also accounts for the dynamics of trust. The WMEAN approach uses an 
aggregation engine that computes the mean of the last 10 results weighted by the 
recency of these results (cf. Huynh, 2006 [21]). As mentioned earlier, there are sev-
eral CTR models that use weighted means to aggregate social evaluations, therefore 
the WMEAN approach will allow us to compare SINALPHA with one model that is 
disseminated in the trust and reputation community. Finally, the QUANT model se-
lects partners by the quantity they are able to provide, and does not take into consid-
eration the trust values of the suppliers. 
For all the models, in the first rounds of each experiment the buyers start to explore 
the space of available candidate partners, by randomly selecting the partners, and after 
some rounds they progressively increase the exploitation by selecting partners based 
on the selected model. In the current experiments (Table 2) the exploration phase ends 
up at round 39 (of 60), for all buyers, meaning that their selection decision relies ex-
clusively on the adopted model after round 40.5 
3.3   Experimental Methodology 
In order to evaluate the approaches described above, we consider that the candidate 
partners have different behaviours and are divided accordingly into categories “SA”, 
“SB”, and “SC”. The behaviour of a supplier is related to the results of the contracts it 
makes, during its lifecycle, with buyer agents. A behaviour is assigned to each supplier 
at its creation time, following a uniform distribution over the three possible categories. 
We consider that the capacity of each type of suppliers in fulfilling the contract  
is modelled by a Markovian process with two states (1 and 0, standing for contract 
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fulfilment and contract violation, respectively) and transition probabilities P11 (Fulfil-
ment-to-Fulfilment) and P01 (Violation-to-Fulfilment). In these experiments, we con-
sider two distinct populations, A and B, as defined at Table 1.  
Table 1. Transition probabilities. Initial probabilities P0 = P1 = 0.50 for both populations 
 Type “SA” Type “SB” Type “SC” 
 P11 P01 P11 P01 P11 P01 
Pop A 0.90 1.00 0.80 0.75 0.50 0.50 
Pop B 0.90 0.20 0.90 0.20 0.80 0.60 
 
As can be seen from the table above, in population A, suppliers of type SA have 
high probability of success and never fail two contracts in a row (once P00 is zero). 
Types SB and SC correspond to progressively worse behaviours. With this population, 
we want to evaluate the capacity of each strategy in choosing the best partners, i.e., 
partners of type SA. Population B, on the other hand, presents a bursty-like pattern of 
behaviour, where candidate partners of types SA and SB generally fulfil several con-
tracts in a row, but when they fail a contract they generally enter in a long burst of 
violated contracts. Type SC presents smaller bursts of both positive and negative be-
haviour. With this population, we pretend to evaluate the performance of each strat-
egy in avoiding long sequences of negative results and in abandoning a good provider 
when it starts to behave in a deceptive way. 
In every experiment, we instantiated 16 suppliers and 8 buyers: two of type SI-
NALPHA, two of type ASYM+, two of type WMEAN and the remaining two of type 
QUANT. Every buyer was allowed to run 60 rounds, corresponding to the launching 
of 60 different cfps. Every experience was run 12 times. Finally, the utility gained by 
each buyer at each negotiation round was recorded, and at the end of the experiments 
the average utility of a buyer and the corresponding standard deviation were evaluated 
for each one of the considered approaches. The average utility captures the capacity 
of the buyer in selecting good partners, and, this way, allows for the evaluation of the 
performance of each one of the three approaches. Table 2 presents compact data about 
the experiments. 
Table 2. Values and parameters used in the experiments 
Fabrics and Quantity Chiffon, Cotton; 180000 
# buyers 2 SINALPHA, 2 ASYM+, 2 WMEAN, 2 QUANT 
# of sellers 16 
Types of sellers Chosen upon a uniform distribution over the 
types {“SA”, “SB”, “SC”} 
# issued CFP per buyer, per run 60 
# runs per experiment 12 
Exploit/Exploration formula Uniform distribution over f(x), where f(x) = 
100 – roundi * 7, f(x) = 5, if (100 – roundi * 7 < 
10), f(x) = 0 if roundi > 40;  0< i <60 
SinAlpha parameters δ = 0.5; ω = π/2; λ = +1 for successful  
contracts, and λ = -1.5 for violations 
 3.4   Results 
We used three different metrics to evaluate the performance of the three approaches in 
evaluation in the experiments with population A. First, we measured the utility gained 
by each buyer in the last 20 rounds in each experiment, and averaged the results ob-
tained for each approach over the 12 experiments. The results concerning the average 
utility showed that the both models that accounts for the described dynamics of trust 
outperformed the other two models (SINALPHA: 92.1%; ASYM+: 93.3%; WMEAN: 
87.1%; QUANT: 79.8%). Then, we counted the number of violated contracts per 
buyer in its last 10 transactions, and averaged this number per approach and over the 
12 runs of the experiment. The results show a clear advantage of SINALPHA in 
avoiding partners with past bad experience: 11.7% of violated contracts (vc), with 
standard deviation (sd) of 0.78, when compared to ASYM+ (12.1% vc, 1.38 sd), 
WMEAN (18.3% vc, 1.37 sd) and QUANT (22.1% vc, 3.20 sd). 
Finally, we counted the number of suppliers of types SA, SB and SC that were cho-
sen by each buyer in its last 20 transactions, and averaged this number per approach, 
over the 12 runs. In this step, we intend to further understand the differences between 
the proposed SinAlpha curve and the weighted mean approach, and, this way, we only 
present the results obtained for SINALPHA and WMEAN. The results showed that 
with the SINALPHA approach the buyers were able to choose the best suppliers (of 
type SA) 91% of the times, and suppliers of type SB the remaining 9%. On the other 
hand, buyers that used the WMEAN approach were less effective in choosing suppli-
ers of type SA (they did it 75% of the times) and they even choose bad suppliers of 
type SC 5% of the times. Suppliers of type SB were chosen 20% of the times. 
We repeated the first two procedures described above with population B, and the 
results are as follows. SINALPHA got an average utility of 79.8%, outperforming 
ASYM+ (78.8%) and QUANT (62.3%), but underperforming the WMEAN approach, 
that achieved an average utility in the last 20 rounds of 83.3%. Concerning the aver-
age of violated contracts in the last 10 transactions of each buyer, SINALPHA  
performed a little better than the remaining approaches, getting 22.9% of violated 
contracts (vc) and standard deviation (sd) of 2.11, against the results of ASYM+ (25% 
vc, 1.91 sd), WMEAN (24.6% vc, 2.75 sd) and QUANT (38.3% vc, 3.31 sd). 
3.5   Interpretation of the Results 
Starting with Population A, we verified that the QUANT approach gets the worse 
results as expected, as it is not able to differentiate between partners of types SA, SB, 
and SC. We also verified that SINALPHA and ASYM+ tend to perform in a similar 
way, with SINALPHA slightly outperforming ASYM+. This is because both models 
use sigmoid like curves and accounts for the same described trust dynamics. Because 
of space concerns, we relegate a further comparison of these two our models to a 
future paper. Finally, we observed that the SINALPHA approach outperforms the 
WMEAN approach, particularly when we attend to the figures related to the violated 
contracts in the last 10 interactions and to the capacity of each approach in selecting 
good (SA) partners. By analyzing the traces of the experiments, we realize that the 
SINALPHA strategy selects primarily partners of type SA, while the WMEAN equally 
selects partners of types SA and SB. The difference between both approaches is that in 
SINALPHA all the historical path is taken into account in the process of trust con-
struction, and partners have to accumulate several good experiences in the past until 
they are able to get an average to high trust score. In opposition, by aggregating up to 
the last N results, the WMEAN approach allows the selection of partners with fewer 
past events. In reality, we verified that the bad choices of WMEAN on population A 
were related to the selection of SB and SC partners in two distinct situations: i) when 
they were selected with less than 10 past results (e.g. the pattern of the previous evi-
dences to the time of selection where V-F-F-V-F-F, where V means a violated con-
tract and F a fulfilled contract); and ii) when they showed an intermittent pattern 
followed by a short number of positive evidences (e.g. F-V-V-F-V-F-V-V-F-F-F-F-F). 
This last pattern of behaviour is indeed severely punished by the SINALPHA ap-
proach, where violations weight more than fulfilments (therefore penalizing undesir-
able intermittent patterns), and where the last five positive evidences are not sufficient 
to ‘push’ the confidence level of the partner to the second third of the SinAlpha curve. 
In the experiments with population B, we intended to study the performance of the 
SINALPHA and the WMEAN strategies in the presence of extreme partners’ behav-
iour, particularly the cases where good partners, which have been successfully in 
fulfilling their obligations, suddenly start having systematic deceptive behaviour. By 
analysis of the traces of the experiments, we realized that both strategies act quite 
differently as they tend to select different partners in similar conditions. In fact, the 
WMEAN strategy privileges recency and puts a limit to the historical analyses (in our 
experiments, it aggregates the last 10 contract results). In one hand, this permits that a 
candidate partner with few past results (let us say 6 past results, while majority posi-
tives), is chosen in detriment of a partner that has been reliable for a long time but that 
violated the last 2 to 4 contracts. As we are selecting partners using too few results, a 
considerable risk is associated to the partner’s selection using WMEAN.6 On the other 
hand, in similar conditions, the SINALPHA approach does not select the described 
partners, as the SinAlpha curve encompasses a “growing path” that partners shall run 
until they acquire middle to high trust (i.e., until they reach the last two thirds of the 
curve). This means that in the scenario of population B, the SINALPHA approach has 
bigger tendency to enter a burst of deceptive behaviour and is somewhat slower in 
penalizing good partners that inverted their behaviour. However, we detected another 
problem associated to the WMEAN approach, which helps to explain the results in 
terms of violated contracts: as this strategy privileges recency, it actually assigns high 
trust levels to candidate partners that systematically behaved deceptively in the past, 
had no classification for a long time, and then got one positive classification in the 
present. Using common sense, we can deduce that this kind of behaviour encom-
passes a high degree of risk; however, we realized that in the described cases the 
WMEAN approach chooses these partners in detriment of more stable partners that 
happened to fail the last couple of contracts. 
Although not mentioned in section 3.3, we run a different type of experiment using 
population A and the Repast agent simulator7. In this experiment, we run the SINAL-
PHA and the WMEAN approaches separately; i.e., we maintained the number of 
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 suppliers (16), but all the 8 buyers were either using SINALPHA or WMEAN. Each 
run took 100 rounds. In the first 40 rounds, the selection of suppliers was done ran-
domly, and in the last 60 rounds the selection was done taking into account the ap-
proach used by the buyers. At round 70, for both approaches, all suppliers of type SA 
abruptly changed their behaviour and assumed the characteristics of type SC, and the 
remaining suppliers kept their initial behaviour. With this experiment, we intended to 
study the abuse of prior information scenario defined in [8]. The results that we ob-
tained showed a similar capacity of SINALPHA and WMEAN in detecting and penal-
izing the change of behaviour of suppliers that were originally of type SA. However, 
the most interesting result of this experiment was the capacity of SINALPHA buyers 
in adapting to the situation by massively choosing suppliers of type SB after round 70. 
Concerning WMEAN buyers, although they also increased the number of selected SB 
partners after round 70, they show an undesirable side effect of also considerably 
increasing the selection of partners that were originally of type SC. This behaviour 
shall be analysed with further detail in future work. 
4   Concluding Remarks and Future Work 
The work presented in this paper started by empirically searching a mathematical 
function that would allow to aggregate evaluations on a given partner that encom-
passes the evolutionary performance of the target. This search was driven by eco-
nomical common sense. For example, and simply putting, a business player would 
certainly distinguish between the following patterns of behaviour: good-good-good-
good-bad-bad-bad-bad, good-bad-good-bad-good-bad-good-bad and bad-bad-good-
bad-good-good-good-bad. We have put thorough attention in the sequences of  
possible results, always taking into consideration common sense about business no-
tions. For instance, a partner that ever succeed with its obligations and achieved a 
high degree of trustworthiness should not be severely punished if he accidentally is 
not successful in the last actual transaction; a partner that succeed the first two obliga-
tions but does not entered any other transaction after that cannot be considered highly 
reputed, as there is not enough information on the past he had carried out until be 
considered reputable. Also, a partner that achieved a given trust level should not 
maintain this level if he starts behaving in an intermittent way. Following this reason-
ing process, we came across the SinAlpha function. 
The experiences we run on two different populations allow us to conclude that the 
SinAlpha function actually gets better results than a weighted mean by recency ap-
proach, because it takes into account the dynamics of trust. Also, the results obtained 
seem to show that there is still margin to improve the performance of the proposed 
mechanism by adapting/learning the values of parameters λ and ω to the perceived 
patterns of the current populations. In fact, the next phase of our work would be dedi-
cated to this topic, and to the inclusion of the erosion property of trust in our ap-
proach. Different type of behaviour patterns shall be defined, as well as experimental 
procedures (e.g. the use of the metric converge speed defined in [8]). 
In the same way, we will continue progressively improving our approach, and sev-
eral research challenges would certainly be presented. Namely, we propose as future  
 
work to identify and to categorize patterns of behaviour as new target evidences ap-
pear, through the usage of clustering techniques; and to consider multi-attribute 
evaluations (e.g. price, delivery time, and quality). 
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